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COMMENTS 
ADMINisTBATIVE LAw -· FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST 
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS - The increasing tendency of state 
legislatures to establish administrative agencies to regulate various spe-
cialized fields has created serious new problems for both courts and 
lawyers. In dealing with state administrative agencies, the federal 
courts have been confronted with the dual problem of protecting the 
individual's constitutional rights and at the same time respecting the 
prerogatives of the states. The result has been the development of a 
"hands-off" policy in the federal courts, leaving the initial determina-
568 MmmGAN LAw R:evmw [ Vol. 52 
tion of rights to the state courts, and limiting the use of the federal 
injunctive power. The purpose of this comment is to indicate the 
limitations now placed on resort to federal injunctive relief against 
state administrative orders. 
I 
Faced with a need to obtain relief for his client against a confisca-
tory state administrative rate order, a lawyer will attempt to choose 
the forum which will give him the most adequate and sympathetic 
hearing. Until 1908 he could seek an injunction against the order 
from a federal district court, if he could show the required diversity 
of citizenship of the parties, or if he could raise a federal question.1 
In that year, however, the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Prentis 11. Atlantic Coast Line Co.2 imposed a major limitation on this 
resort. Thereafter, it was announced, the petitioner would be required 
to exhaust all the administrative appeals provided by the state, includ-
ing "administrative appeal" in state courts, before he could ask a fed-
eral court for an injunction. For this purpose administrative appeals in 
the courts are distinguished from judicial appeals on several grounds. 
First of all, if the court can "affirm, modify, or revoke" the order ap-
pealed from, it is in effect passing upon a basic policy question and 
making a new order, so the process is deemed to be administrative.3 
On the other hand, if the court is limited to passing on the validity 
of the existing order, the appeal is judicial.4 The Supreme Court also 
announced that the administrative appeal does not result in a decision 
to which the rules of res judicata apply.5 Subsequently the Supreme 
Court stated it would not hear a review of an administrative appeal. 6 
A judicial appeal, however, does result in res judicata, so the only re-
maining remedy is review by the Supreme Court.7 
State authorities at the time of the Prentis case were already mani-
festing dissatisfaction with the system that allowed a single federal 
judge to enjoin state action.8 Congress consequently enacted legisla-
11 Stat. L. 78 (1789), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1332. 
2211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908). 
3Ibid. 
4 Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 44 S.Ct. 553 
(1924); Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U.S. 134, 34 S.Ct. 283 (1914). 
5 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908). 
6 Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 50 S.Ct. 389 
(1930). . 
7 Stason, "Methods of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action," 24 A.B.A.J. 274 
(1938); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908). 
s For an account of the history of the Johnson Act, 48 Stat. L. 775 (1934), as 
amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1342, see Stason, ''Methods of Judicial Relief from 
Administrative Action," 24 A.B.A.J. 274 (1938). 
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tion which limits the use of the injunction by requiring a three-judge 
district court for the setting aside of state administrative orders,9 and 
which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court.10 A later con-
gressional enactment requires the federal district courts to stay action 
if the state has granted a stay of the order pending determination of 
the state action to enforce the order.11 Still later appeared the John-
son Act,12 pursuant to which, if jurisdiction is based on diversity of 
citizenship or a federal question of constitutionality, a state rate order 
cannot be enjoined if the order does not interfere with interstate com-
merce and if there is a plain, adequate, and. speedy remedy provided by 
state law. Moreover, an assessment, levy, or collection of a tax under 
state law may not be enjoined if there is a plain, adequate, and speedy 
state remedy.13 All of these limitations serve to impose substantial 
qualifications upon the federal equity injunction against state admin-
istrative orders. 
II 
In cases not specifically dealing with administrative law, the courts 
have placed other limitations on the general power of the federal dis-
trict courts to grant injunctions before the state courts have been 
given a chance for judicial review. State criminal proceedings will 
not be enjoined unless there is danger of irreparable injury.14 The 
state's fiscal affairs will not be interfered ·with.15 If the interests of the 
parties are properly protected by state laws, and an adequate procedure 
is provided, liquidation of state banks on insolvency is left to state 
courts.16 Even in bankruptcy proceedings, matters requiring ultimate 
. determination by state courts will be left to the state court for decision, 
and the federal bankruptcy proceeding will be stayed for such de-
termination.17 When an action is brought to shape a domestic policy 
9 36 Stat. L. 557 (1910), 43 Stat. L. 938 (1925), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 
1952) §2281. 
10 36 Stat. L. 557 (1910), 43 Stat. L. 938 (1925), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. 
V, 1952) §1253. 
1137 Stat. L. 1014 (1913), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2284(5). 
12 48 Stat. L. 775 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1342. 
1s 50 Stat. L. 738 (1937), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1341. 
14 Spielman Motor Sales Co., Inc. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 55 S.Ct. 678 (1935); 
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962 (1941); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 
U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943). 
lUMatthews v. Rodgets, 284 U.S. 521, 52 S.Ct. 217 (1932); Ristey v. Chicago, R.I. 
& P. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 378, 46 S.Ct. 236 (1926) (equity can act if the entire tax statute 
is attacked as unconstitutional). 
16Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 55 S.Ct. 380 (1935). 
17Thompson, Trustee v. Magnolia Petroleum. Co., 309 U.S. 478, 60 S.Ct. 628 (1940). 
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within the state, federal equity will not interfere.18 And, of course, 
in every case a cause of action has to be stated which will give equity 
jurisdiction to a federal court.19 If a question of state law is to be de-
cided, the federal district court can stay proceedings until the state 
court decides the state law question.20 There is some suggestion, too, 
that the older view that "adequate remedy in law" referred only to 
federal remedy21 has been changing to the view that it also includes 
state remedies.22 
While there has been an occasional judicial expression to the effect 
that the district court can decide state law questions itself if the mat-
ter is essentially federal,23 the tendency has been such that the attor-
ney general's committee in its first report suggested that there has been 
less and less federal review of many questions where appeal formerly 
was considered important.24 
m 
Soon after the Prentis case25 was decided, the courts began to 
limit its application. If the administrative agency delayed for an unrea-
sonable time in reaching a decision, the petitioner could go into the 
district court without waiting for a :final 'administrative order.26 If the 
agency lacked power to act, there was no need to resort to it.27 When 
irreparable damage was being done, and no stay was provided pending 
1s Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070 (1943); 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098 (1943); In re President and Fellows 
of Harvard College, (1st Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 69. 
19 Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 59 S.Ct. 657 (1939). 
20RaiJroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643 (1941); 
Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 29 S.Ct. 451 (1909). To the list 
of exceptions should be added the power to refuse jurisdiction in admiralty, represented by 
Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 52 S.Ct. 413 (1932). 
The e.-:ercise of such discretion will be set aside only when there is clearly an abuse. 
21 Smyth v • .Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S.Ct. 418 (1898); Spector Motor Service, Inc. 
v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 71 S.Ct. 508 (1951). . 
22 Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070 
(1943); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947) (suggesting the 
court may apply the forum non conveniens rule when the state can give adequate relief). 
23Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 29 S.Ct. 451 (1909); 
Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 at 51, 58 S.Ct. 459 (1937); In 
re President and Fellows of Harvard College, (1st Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 69 (when 
jurisdiction attaches, court will decide state law questions except in exceptional circum-
stances); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Commissionexs, 
(D.C. N.J. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 521; Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel 
Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 63 S.Ct. 369 (1943). 
24S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941). 
2s Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908). 
26 Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 46 S.Ct. 408 (1926). 
27Buder v. First National Bank in St. Louis, (8th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 990, cert. 
den. 274 U.S. 743, 47 S.Ct. 588 (1927). 
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appeal, petitioner could seek a federal injunction at once.28 If the 
petitioner claimed the statute was unconstitutional, the federal court 
was immediately available.29 A statutory opportunity for rehearing 
before the agency had to be resorted to only if the state made an appli-
cation for such rehearing mandatory.30 
However, the basic "exhaustion rule" of the Prentis case31 remains. 
The reasons given for this rule are that it effects a better working 
relation between the federal and state governments and that the court 
is unwilling to reach a decision only to find the work rendered useless 
when th~ higher state body holds the order improper. Prior to the 
Prentis decision, the courts had already decided that application to 
the agency itself was a condition of federal relief-the so-called "prior 
resort" rule. Perhaps some of the reasons which had caused the courts 
to develop that rule also played a part in the evolution of the rule 
in the Prentis case. Indeed, there might be a complete denial of relief 
on the ground that there was a failure to pursue the administrative 
remedy.32 The reasons generally given for the "prior resort" rule are 
the need of uniformity in application of the agency rules, something 
that cannot be achieved if the federal equity courts may pass in the 
first instances on the cases, 33 and the fact that the agency generally 
possesses more adequate lmowledge than the court on the specialized 
subject the agency is created to hanclle.34 Thus, the person who fears 
that a general administrative rule or policy will be confiscatory when 
applied to him is required to apply first to the agency for a determina-
tion of applicability in his case.35 
2s Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 43 S.Ct. 353 (1923); Pacific 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 44 S.Ct. 553 (1924). 
20 Buder v. Fust National Bank in St. Louis, (8th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 990, cert. 
den. 274 U.S. 743, 47 S.Ct. 588 (1927); Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Ivlinne-
sota v. Duluth R. Co., 273 U.S. 625, 47 S.Ct. 489 (1927). 
30Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 43 S.Ct. 466 (1923); 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of South Carolina, (D.C. S.C. 
1948) 77 F. Supp. 675. But see Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 98 
F. (2d) 282, suggesting that a merely permissive rehearing must be exhausted. 
31 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908). 
32 First National Bank 0£ Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners of the County 
of Weld, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S.Ct. 385 (1924). The decision limited itself to tax assessment 
cases on the grounds of public need for prompt determination. The rule appears to be one 
of estoppel. See Stason,. ''Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Ar::-
tion," 25 MINN. L. R:sv. 560 (1941). 
33Texas ancl Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350 
(1907). 
34RaiJroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 60 
S.Ct. 1021 (1940), 311 U.S. 614, 61 S.Ct. 66 (1940), 311 U.S. 570, 61 S.Ct. 343 (1941). 
35Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350 
(1907); Great Northem Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 S.Ct. 477 
(1922); United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474, 52 S.Ct. 
247 (1932). 
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IV 
While federal injunctive relief was somewhat disfavored, never-
theless it appears to have been the rule until 1951 that there did not 
need to be exhaustion of state judicial remedies before the petitioner 
sought an injunction in federal courts.36 In such instances federal 
jurisdiction was concurrent with that of state courts,37 and the peti-
tioner had the privilege of choosing his forum. If chosen, the federal 
court had the duty to take jurisdiction.38 Apprehension was sometimes 
expressed that if state judicial remedies were utilized, the petitioner 
would reach the Supreme Court with the facts decided against him,39 
notwithstanding the fact that the Ben Avon decision40 indicated the 
Supreme Court had to be afforded the power to review the facts when 
an order was alleged to be confiscatory. 
Then in 1951 came the decision in Alabama Public Service Com-
mission v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co.41 In that case the Supreme Court 
held that a federal district court should, in the exercise of its discretion, 
refuse jurisdiction in an injunction proceeding against a public service 
commission when the state judicial remedies have not been exhausted. 
The Alabama suit was brought to enjoin an order requiring the railroad 
to maintain two local trains a day between certain points. The plaintiff 
contended that the operation was so costly as to amount to confiscation. 
Two justices concurred in the Supreme Court's decision on the ground 
that the company had not shown it was losing money on the entire 
operation in the state and hence that there was confiscation. Never-
theless, they objected to the majority opinion, contending that in 
36Lilienthal, "The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities," 43 HAnv. 
L. R:sv. 379 (1929), suggests that the right to by-pass the state courts for a federal injunc-
tion was recognized "beyond question." See Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U.S. 134, 34 
S.Ct. 283 (1914); Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Minnesota v. Duluth Street 
Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 625, 47 S.Ct. 489 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872 
(1939); Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v. Elease, (D.C. S.C. 1927) 42 F. (2d) 463; 
Ann Arbor R. Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, (D.C. Mich. 1950) 91 F. 
Supp. 668; Southern Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, (D.C. Ala. 1950) 
91 F. Supp. 980. 
37 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 (1821). 
38 Ibid.; Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 at 40, 29 S.Ct. 192 (1909) 
("That the case may be one of local interest only jg entirely immaterial •••• "); Prentis v. 
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 at 228, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908) ("A State cannot tie 
up a citizen of another State, having property within its territory invaded by unauthorized 
acts of its own officers, to suits for redress in its own courts"). 
39 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908). 
40 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. ]Jen Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920). 
Other decisions also held constitutional facts were a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. St. 
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S.Ct. 720 (1936); Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 (1908). 
41341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762 (1951). 
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requiring resort to the state courts in such cases the decision served 
to overturn "a long course of decisions and, in effect, to repeal an act 
of Congress defining the jurisdiction of the district courts."42 
The Alabama Public Service Commission decision appears to put 
new life into the Prentis doctrine.43 Evidently if there is any state court 
remedy, whether it is administrative or judicial, the petitioner must ex-
haust it before he can proceed in the federal courts. About the same 
reasons are given for the need to exhaust judicial remedies as were 
given in the Prentis · case. Another possible reason for the decision 
is the desire to relieve the federal docket.44 The Prentis case had 
indicated that exhaustion of state administrative appeals before coming 
into federal courts for an injunction would not place the petitioner in 
a position in which he was barred from litigating the facts by res 
judicata. The Prentis case continued, however, that exhaustion of 
state judicial remedies would result in res judicata, so that these state 
judicial remedies need not be exhausted before petitioner could seek 
federal injunctive relief. The Alabama case4i; appears to do away 
·with this res judicata distinction between state administrative and 
judicial appeals. This elimination of the res judicata distinction appears 
to be in line with the gradual extinction of the Ben Avon ruling46 that 
in a case of alleged confiscation, the court must look at both law and 
facts.47 Redetermination of the facts by the courts no longer seems 
important. 
V 
While it is too early to be sure what effect the Alabama decision 
will have on administrative law, some generalizations can be made at 
this time. Lower courts in general are consistently applying the de-
42 Id. at 355. One other possible change in the law should be noted. The old view, 
represented by Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S.Ct. 418 (1898), had been that in 
determining the reasonableness of an administrative rate order, the actual transaction would 
govern, and the net gain from total operation, or even state operation, would have no bearlng 
on the case. The concurring opinion suggests that a larger view may now be taken. 
43 P.rentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908:). 
44 46 Ir.r.. L. fuv. 756 (1951). 
4G Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 
762 (1951). 
46 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920). 
47 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 at 321, 56 S.Ct. 466 
(1936): "We think ••• that the opportunity to resort to equity, in the absence of an 
adequate legal remedy • • • should not be curtailed because of reluctance to decide consti· 
tutional questions." But the Court later began to allow the agency to determine the "juris-
dictional facts," Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459 
(1938), and then it was held that rates had to be clearly confiscatory before equity would 
intervene, Vincennes Water Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, (7th 
Cir. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 5, cert. den. 280 U.S. 567, 50 S.Ct. 26 (1929). 
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cision to require judicial review in state courts prior to any federal 
action.48 One court suggests that "adequate remedy at law" now 
clearly refers to state remedy as well as federal remedy.49 
But limitations are being placed on the doctrine as well. One 
court has said that the rule applies only to regulatory orders, as dis-
tinguished from allegedly unconstitutional tax levies by state agencies.1so 
The federal district court of Minnesota suggests that predominantly 
local factors must be found in the case before the federal equity court 
will refuse jurisdiction.51 The New Jersey federal district court has 
made a similar statement, holding that it would retain jurisdiction 
when federal law must be weighed against state rules even when the 
state rules have not been construed.52 The California federal court 
asserts that the Alabama doctrine applies only to constitutional im-
proprieties in enforcing state laws, not to cases in which state law 
conflicts with a federal statute.53 The doctrine has been held not to 
apply to fundamental rights which petitioner declared were denied 
by a state administrative body.54 In Peay 11. Cox the court, after citing 
the Alabama case, continues: "The only trouble here [in the use of 
discretion] comes from the distinction set up in some of the cases 
between State remedies which are administrative ._ .. [as in this case] 
and those which are judicial and operate only to shift the case from 
a federal court into a state court and end in a res judicata • . • . Such 
a remedy need not be exhausted."55 This dicta has the appearance of 
desire to nullify the Alabama decision. It would seem,· therefore, 
that the last word on the question of exhaustion of judicial remedies 
in state courts has not as yet been said. 
48 Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. Mmphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., (D.C. Mum. 
1952) 101 F. Supp. 978; Pierce v. Hildebrand, (D.C. Iowa 1952) 103 F. Supp. 396; 
Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, (D.C. Pa. 1952) 
109 F. Supp. 385. Cf. Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., (5th Cir. 1952) 
195 F. (2d) 406. 
49 Local 333B, United Marine Division of International Longshoremen's Assn. v. 
Battle, Governor of Virginia, (D.C. Va. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 650, alfd. per curlam 342 U.S. 
880, 72 S.Ct. 178 (1951). 
50 Centrnl Steel & Wire Co. v. Detroit, (D.C. Mich. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 470. This 
case was not in equity. The complaint was brought to recover taxes paid under protest, 
and unconstitutionality was claimed. 
61 Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. Mmphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., (D.C. Mum. 
1952) 101 F. Supp. 978 ai: 981. 
62Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 
(D.C. N.J. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 521. 
63 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, (D.C. Cal. 
1952) 109 F. Supp. 13. Cf. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Public 
Utility Commissionexs, (D.C. N.J. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 521. 
6t Wilson v. Beebe, (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 418. 
65 (5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 123 at 125, cert. den. 342 U.S. 896, 72 S.Ct. 230 
(1951). 
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VI 
The Alabama decision66 does provide a new and clear-cut rule: 
it is necessary to make use of all the state remedies provided, whether 
at the administrative level ·or at the court level, whether "administra-
tive" in nature or judicial. The rule simplifies procedure and mini-
mizes the possibility of error. A wrong step, under the old rule, could 
cost the petitioner his case, or, at best, a great deal of time and ex-
pense.67 The Supreme Court has held, of course, that if no state 
judicial review is provided, the statute creating the agency is uncon-
stitutional.58 Now it appears that this state review must be followed, 
with review by the Supreme Court as a final protection, and 'With. stay 
of enforcement during the appeals as a means of preventing irreparable 
damage. The rule, however, is one of "comity and convenience."59 
A major question of policy remains to be answered: should the Su-
preme Court legislate, where Congress has not done so, to deprive 
petitioners of the concurrent federal court action-a very speedy and 
efficient means of preventing enforcement of improper state adminis-
trative orders? 
John C. Hall, S.Ed. 
50 Aia'bama Pu'blic Service Commission v. Southem Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 
762 (1951). 
67 46 Ir.x.. L. R:ev. 756 (1951). Nine years were required for a nnal decision in 
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 71 S.Ct. 508 (1951). 
68 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920). 
69 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643 (1941); 
Alabama Pu'blic Service Commission v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762 
(1951). 
